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Abstract
Climate change is a problem which is global both in terms of causes and consequences.
The uncertainties are large and likely to persist. Meanwhile, the political and economic
stakes of both action and inaction are much higher than those in other transboundary
concerns such as acid rain and ozone depletion. The public policy impact of scientific
opinions on climate change, therefore, not only depends upon what is being said, but also,
who is advancing those conclusions and how they were arrived at. This was the rationale
behind the setting up of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988.
In the years since, the IPCC has attempted to walk the tightrope of being scientifically
sound and politically correct. This paper examines the processes which led to its creation
and how it has evolved over two assessment cycles. The paper attempts to address the
question of whether such an assessment set-up was necessary, if indeed it has been
relevant, and what some indicators might be to evaluate the performance of the IPCC.
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Introductioni
Nine years have elapsed since the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
was established in 1988 to assess the available information on climate change. The IPCC
was created jointly by two United Nations agencies: the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and
now has the participation of national governments worldwide. At the same time it attracts
an exceptionally large number of qualified experts in an assessment process involving
multiple worldwide peer reviews. Through this innovative set-up the founding fathers of
the IPCC sought to advance what many thought was an oxymoron: quality scientific
assessments by democratic consensus.
While there is considerable literature citing conclusions reached by the IPCC, detailed
analyses of the institution, its assessment process and outputs are very limited. Past
attempts in this direction can be broadly categorized as output oriented: both at the level
of overall assessment reviews (Schneider, 1991; Jefferson, 1996; Singer, 1996), and at
the level of questioning specific scientific and technical assumptions underlying sections
of IPCC assessments (Lindzen, 1992; Linden, 1993; Meyer and Cooper, 1995); process
oriented (Fitzgerald, 1990; Boehmer-Christiansen, 1994a; Boehmer-Christiansen,
1994b); and use oriented (Boehmer-Christiansen and Skea, 1994c). Analyses in the latter
two categories are largely restricted to the First Assessment cycle of the IPCC which
ended in 1990, or at most, until 1992, when an update for the Earth Summit negotiations
was published. There has also been a tendency to focus almost exclusively on the
"Science" Working Group of the IPCC - Working Group 1. Finally, while rudimentary
descriptions of the IPCC history and process are invariably included in such accounts,
very little attention is paid to the question of why an intergovernmental assessment
mechanism was deemed necessary in the first place, what the various intricacies in its
institutional structure are, and how they have been shaped over time.
This paper aims to fill these important research gaps. Its mission is threefold: descriptive,
explanatory and evaluative. The unit of analysis is the assessment process itself, not
specific reports or Working Groups. The goal of this paper is not to delve into micro-
level issues at the level of, for example, the choice of particular forcing parameters to
drive General Circulation Models (GCMs). Yet, the analysis goes much beyond
providing a simple historical narrative of the configuration of the IPCC. An attempt is
made to highlight significant but hitherto neglected aspects of the process, such as, the
involvement of developing countries, the logic underlying the scope and mandate of the
IPCC Working Groups, who the intended users of IPCC assessments are, and whether
and how the assessment process has been responsive to their needs over time.
Section 2 of this paper sets the context of the climate problem and how it evolved over
time. Section 3 attempts to unravel the processes which caused the IPCC to be set up
when it was and how it was, as opposed to different times and different forms. Section 4
accounts for the factors which shaped the form and structure of the IPCC between its
conception and birth. Section 5 details the evolution of certain key aspects in its structure
during the course of its First and Second Assessment cycles: the peer review process,
developing country participation and the links between IPCC and the Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). Finally, Section 6 draws conclusions as to
whether an IPCC-like set-up was indeed necessary, whether an international effort more
on the lines of the ozone assessments would have sufficed for climate change, and what
some indirect indicators might be to measure the performance of the IPCC.
The Context
The theory of the greenhouse effect goes back to over a hundred years (Tyndall, 1863;
Arrhenius, 1896). The role of human activities in increasing concentrations of greenhouse
gases has come under growing scrutiny only since the late 1950s when monitoring of
atmospheric carbon-dioxide concentrations began in Antarctica and Hawaii (Keeling et
aI., 1984). Scientific interest in man's impact on global climate and the possible societal
impacts of these changes came to be mobilized through conferences, loose research
networks and assessments, particularly from 1970 onwards ii (SCEP, 1970; SMIC, 1971;
Mormino et al. 1975; NRC, 1979). There were relatively brief periods of interest in
global cooling due to the effect of industrial aerosols from the late 1960s to early 1970s iii
and climate variability which gained prominence in the mid-1970s due to the prolonged
drought in the Sahel. However, by the early 1980s the predominant focus of the scientific
community had converged on the possibility of warming trends in the mean climate
stemming from increased greenhouse gas concentrations.
The First World Climate Conference in 1979 provided a major international forum
devoted exclusively to climate change but it did not make any calls for policy action
(WMO, 1979). It did, however, result in the creation of the World Climate Programme
and set forth a series of workshops organized under the auspices of WMO, UNEP and the
International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) to better understand the problem.
These workshops were held in Villach, Austria in 1980, 1983 and 1985 and drew on a
UNEP funded research effort underway at International Meteorological Institute,
Stockholm between 1982 and 1985;v. It was at Villach 1985 that a consensus was reached
by an international group of scientists (participating in their personal capacities) that "in
the first half of the next century a rise of global mean temperature would occur which is
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greater than any in man's history". These experts also recommended that "scientists and
policymakers should begin active coIlaboration to explore the effectiveness of alternative
policies and adjustments"(WMO, 1985).
In the period immediate foIlowing Villach 1985, climate change had truly "arrived" both
in the news media and on the international policy agenda. The range of factors that
contributed to this issue build-up is extremely diverse" the feedbacks between them very
complex and are weIl documented in several good historical accounts. The next section
will trace one strand that has received considerably less attention: how the Villach 1985
findings influenced decisionmaking in the international bodies which had sponsored it,
and how their institutional responses as weIl as influence from key individuals and one
government eventuaIly resulted in the setting up of an intergovernmental panel - the
IPCC, to assess climate change.
Genesis of the IPCC
There were four key actors on the international arena at the time the Villach 1985
recommendations came out: UNEP, WMO, ICSU and the United States. UNEP, WMO
and ICSU had been coIlaborating closely both in climate research through the World
Climate Programme, and in assessments through the Villach series of workshops between
1980 and 1985. FoIlowing the 1985 workshop as discussions moved more towards
international policy responses ICSU's involvement as an institution declined. Some key
ICSU scientists, most notably Bert Bolin, did however play important roles in the
evolving policy debate. ICSU meanwhile continued to focus on global change research,
particularly through the International Geosphere Biosphere Program (IGBP) which it
established in 1986.
The fourth and final player, the United States, was in a unique position. First, it had the
most cumulative expertise both in climate change research and in assessments from the
Climate Impact Assessment Program (Mormino et aI., 1975) and National Research
Council (NRC, 1977; NRC, 1979; NRC, 1983) to Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA, 1983; EPA, 1986), and the Department of Energy (DoE, 1985). These assessments
helped shape the flavor of those done in other countries (such as Germany) and the
fledgling international effort. Second, the US had a huge stake in the climate problem. It
was the biggest contributor to greenhouse gas emissions. Also, any measures at
abatement of future emissions could significantly threaten its economic interests.
Powerful fossil fuel lobbies with active support from a Republican White House were
strongly opposed to any kind of action on climate change. Third, being the biggest
financial patron of the UN system the US carried considerable clout in decisionmaking
circles at WMO and UNEP. Fourth, and perhaps most interestingly, various US agencies
and research establishments had very different positions on climate change, particularly
with regard to the need for any policy responses to it. While assessments like NRC
(1983) emphasized scientific uncertainties and advocated a cautious "wait and see"
approach, an EPA assessment published the same year painted a dramaticaIly different
picture with potentially catastrophic consequences resulting from uncontroIled climate
change (EPA, 1983).
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Meanwhile, UNEP and its pro-active Director Mostafa Tolba had no doubts about the
future course of action on climate change. Flush with the success of negotiating the
Vienna Convention on Ozone, he felt that the time was ripe to repeat the ozone "miracle"
for climate. Indeed, UNEP it its long range planning document of 1985 had called for a
climate convention. In the wake of the 1985 Villach workshop Tolba began active
consultations for a possible convention with WMO and ICSU, UNEP's two long-standing
collaborators on climate change. He also wrote to then US Secretary of State George
Schultz urging the US to take appropriate actions (Hecht and Tirpak, 1995). Tolba's
efforts stimulated two sets of interactions between these four key actors.
An Immediate Response: The Advisory Group on Greenhouse
Gases (AGGG)
In a meeting organized by UNEP, WMO and ICSU a decision was made to jointly set up
an advisory panel : the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (AGGG) in July 1986.
This blue ribbon panel consisted of a total of six members: Gordon Goodman, Bert Bolin,
Ken Hare, G. Golitsyn, Sukiyoro Manabe and M. Kassas . Each of the three participating
bodies had nominated two experts. The AGGG mandate, in fact, stemmed directly from
Villach 1985 which had suggested that "UNEP, WMO, and ICSU should establish a
small task force on greenhouse gases..to initiate if necessary, consideration of a global
convention" (WMO, 1985). This was, however, not the first international advisory panel
on climate change: two notable precedents are a panel of experts to better understand
climate change set up by the Executive Council of the WMO in 1974, and another
somewhat similar panel set up by the WMO, but under mandate from the UN General
Assembly in 1975.
There were some crucial shortcomings in the design of the AGGG. Bert Bolin, a member
of this group and veteran of almost all international climate change assessment efforts
from 1970 onwards recalls that he was "very ambivalent to the work of the AGGG
because it had no money and no muscle" (Bolin, 1997). Eventually, Gordon Goodman,
another AGGG member and Executive Director of the Beijer Institute (later, the
Stockholm Environment Institute) got money from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund to
commission two inter-linked workshops in September and November 1987 at Villach and
Bellagio respectively. It is important to note that Villach 1987 was not a continuation of
the series of workshops held at the same venue between 1980 and 1985. The 1987
Villach and Bellagio meetings were held under AGGG auspices, even though many over-
committed AGGG members had limited input or control over them. Many participants at
these workshops believed that despite prevailing uncertainties, aggressive policy action
was needed on climate change. This led to the Bellagio conference proposal that
policymakers should set "maximum" rates of sea level increase at between 20 and 50 mm
per decade and a maximum rate of temperature increase at 0.1"C per decade (Jager,
1988).
Two facts need re-stating. First, these recommendations were not coming from the
"officially mandated" group, that is the AGGG. Second, while ecological thresholds of
climate change might exist under specific contexts, the scientific basis behind drawing
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broadly generalizable thresholds across a whole range of natural and socioeconomic
systems is questionable even ten years later. Furthermore, whether climate change under
any particular (arbitrary) threshold should be defined as socially "tolerable" and
exceeding it as "dangerous" was clearly a value judgment scientists were not qualified to
make. This mood of policy activism continued on to the Toronto Conference of the
Atmosphere in June 1988 (the first "million dollar" meeting on climate change) where a
conclusion by a small group of energy experts up led to a conference declaration caIling
on national governments to reduce carbon-dioxide emissions by 20% from 1988 levels by
2005. The VillachlBellagio recommendations meanwhile were eventually published as a
four volume set by Stockholm Environment Institute in 1990 when they were eclipsed by
the much more influential IPCC First Assessment Report. The last meeting of the AGGG
was held during the Second World Climate Conference in 1990 and it has not undertaken
or sponsored any activities since then.
A Parallel But Delayed Response: An Intergovernmental
Assessment "Mechanism"
Meanwhile, in the United States, Tolba's letter to George Schultz was discussed during
1986 by the inter-agency National Climate Program Policy Board. As referred to earlier,
various US agencies had published their own extensive assessments on climate change
which pre-dated the fledgling international assessment effort. They also had vastly
different takes on both the magnitude of the problem, the need and nature of any possible
responses to it. Due to lack of agreement, and for reasons that suited their own ideologies
and agendas (see Section 3.3), a compromise was reached amongst participating agencies
with the US recommending that an "intergovernmental mechanism" be set-up to conduct
scientific assessment of climate change.
The US position was communicated to the WMO Secretariat and it helped shape
resolution 9 of the Tenth WMO Congress which met in May 1987. This resolution
recognized the need for an inter-disciplinary and multi-agency approach and asked the
Executive Council of WMO "to arrange for appropriate mechanisms to undertake further
development of scientific and other aspects of greenhouse gases". The US also strongly
influenced the WMO Executive Council resolution a week later, which in response to the
call from the Congress, requested the Secretary General of WMO, "in coordination with
the Executive Director of UNEP to establish an intergovernmental mechanism to carry
out internationally coordinated scientific assessments of the magnitude, impact and
potential timing of climate change". Shortly thereafter, UNEP's Governing Body
welcomed the WMO initiative and asked its Executive Director to work with WMO on
establishing such an intergovernmental assessment body.
This constitutes the famous "I" of what was to later become the IPCC and is the single
most critical element in its design. It is the intergovernmental nature of the IPCC that
gives its assessments a special niche, distinct from the myriad other assessments and
vendors. According to Jean Ripert, founder chairman of the Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee (INC) who chaired the negotiations for a climate convention, the
intergovernmental nature of the IPCC was in large part responsible for educating many
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government bureaucrats about the problem which made them more willing to come to the
negotiating table. This, according to Ripert, was key to the signing of FCCC in 1992
(Ripert, 1997). However, having an intergovernmental status has imposed significant
costs also: IPCC assessment summaries are widely regarded as being politically
negotiated which has, at times, undermined their credibility.
Counterfactual Analysis
Having discussed how an intergovernmental mechanism came to be set up, it is also
important to explore why it might have been necessary. Many analysts offer a sequential
explanation of events between 1985 and 1988. For example, Michael Oppenheimer, an
active participant in the 1987 VillachlBellagio workshops and the Toronto Conference
notes, "the Bellagio Report provided a basis for the recommendations of the June 1988
Toronto meeting which in tum provided impetus to the formation of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change" (Oppenheimer, 1989). However, as the
preceding paragraphs clearly show, the process to set up the IPCC was in motion as early
as 1986, and the WMO Executive Council resolution to this effect was passed in June
1987, a few months before the VillachlBellagio workshops, and a full one year before the
Toronto Conference and the hot summer of 1988. These events clearly had no role in the
decision to set up the IPCC, though they might have influenced the level of interest the
institution subsequently generated.
Instead, the trigger for the IPCC was the activism by Mostafa Tolba, the dissatisfaction in
the US about the AGGG, and sharply differing views on climate change amongst various
US government agencies and the White House administration. The subsequent shape the
IPCC took reflected a common denominator agreement between various US agencies.
Reportedly there were also strategic attempts both by WMO and the US to prevent
Mostafa Tolba from "capturing" climate, the way he had, ozone.
A richer analysis of the question Why [PCC ? can be centered around, what political
scientists term as counterfactuals. Or, what else was a possible option?
The first viewpoint is that by the time of Villach 1985 there was enough scientific
knowledge of climate change, no further assessments were necessary, and that it was time
for policy action. Indeed, this is what UNEP's Director Tolba had in mind when he put
out the call for a climate convention in 1985. A convincing case can probably be made
that the scientific basis on climate change by this time was at least as strong as that on
ozone at the time of the Vienna Convention. And it was probably much stronger than that
on acid rain when the Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention was signed
in 1979. Thus, historical precedents would argue for the feasibility of signing at least a
"bare-bones" framework convention on climate change right after the 1985 Villach
workshop.
The reason why even a framework convention did not happen in 1985 is probably
political. By this time it had become evident that any serious response to the climate
problem might eventually require a restructuring of energy sectors which formed the
heart of most economies. This is very different from the cases of ozone depletion and
acid rain. Policy action on climate change needed to be global, would affect entire
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economies and hence widespread governmental support for any policy response from
both developed and developing countries was a must. The international group of experts
assembled in the 1985 Villach meeting were mostly from developed countries and had
participated only in their personal capacities, not as representatives of their respective
governments. Furthermore, in case of both acid rain and ozone depletion a coalition of
influential governments strongly supportive of the idea a convention was already in
existence before they were actually negotiated and signed. Such a governmental coalition
did not exist in case of climate change in 1985. Therefore, irrespective of their scientific
credibility, the Villach 1985 recommendations were not politically sufficient to generate
momentum for a climate convention.
Another possibility could have been to use the Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases
(AGGG) to further develop scientific information and generate governmental interest
necessary for a possible convention. Although the members of the AGGG had
impeccable credentials, the hastiness with which the body was set up in the euphoria
following Villach 1985 resulted in several major design flaws which were later to prove
its undoing. First, the audience of this panel was very narrowly defined. One close
observer compared the six AGGG members to a group of private consultants to the heads
of WMO, UNEP and ICSU. In fact, there were no formal requirements for the group to
report on its activities, or to seek direction from, even the governing bodies of the three
sponsoring organizations, let alone national governments. The gulf between science and
policy could not have been wider. The policy making community which had the ultimate
responsibility of designing and implementing any policies on climate change had little
idea what the AGGG was doing, little say in shaping its priorities and no sense of
participation in the assessment process. Furthermore, the AGGG had no specific mandate
on the range of issues it was supposed to address. Finally, it had no money.
It was under this context that the inter-agency US National Climate Policy Board met to
discuss Tolba's letter for possible actions towards a climate convention. As noted earlier
various US agencies had vastly different takes on both the magnitude of the problem, the
need and nature of any possible responses to it. These opinions came to the fore in the
discussions on Tolba's letter. Most agencies were not supportive of immediate
negotiations for a climate convention. The role of the DoE is particularly interesting. It
argued against using the Villach 1985 report as a justification for a convention on the
grounds that it was "not prepared by government officials" (Hecht and Tirpak, 1995).
The real reasons probably went deeper than that. DoE had its own climate assessment
underway during the period the Villach series of workshops were being conducted at the
international level in the early 1980s. The two processes were vying for the involvement
of many of the same scientists. Some of these experts participated in both, others
preferred the international assessment activity over DoE. Officials from DoE had also
attempted to "market" their own assessment at the Villach 1985 workshop but met with
limited success. Both these factors may have contributed to DoE's resentment against the
international process already underway. This might explain their calls for involvement of
government experts in future international assessment activity.
The dominant position of the (Republican) administration meanwhile was that scientific
evidence on climate change was inconclusive at best and did not justify policy actions
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that would likely be expensive. On the other hand, EPA and the State Department were
supportive of the idea of a convention but suggested governmental involvement in an
international assessment process to resolve contentious scientific issues first (Hecht and
Tirpak, 1995). The eventual compromise: an intergovernmental assessment mechanism
which the US finally proposed addressed DoE concerns regarding involvement of
"official" experts. At the same time it precluded immediate action and provided an
opportunity for the administration to buy time ("let's study the problem more"). Yet, by
encouraging international participation it also made an eventual climate convention more
feasible, consistent with the goals of EPA and the State Department.
There was also a recognition that any proposed international assessment process had to
go much beyond the science of climate change. Thus while WMO was a natural sponsor
for such a process, it did not have sufficient expertise to cover many other relevant
aspects of climate change such as policy responses. This argued for UNEP involvement
though the US had some reservations about Mostafa Tolba. This is because he had
alienated many close allies of the US in Latin America during the ozone negotiations.
There was thus a keen interest on the part of the US not to let Tolba run climate change
with the same degree of control which he had wielded over ozone. Therefore, a proposal
was made for a joint UNEPIWMO intergovernmental mechanism. ICSU, the only other
candidate in the international arena to co-host such a body dropped out partly because it
was more interested in global change research (as opposed to policy), and perhaps due to
definitional reasons: the US proposal was for an intergovernmental mechanism while
ICSU was non-governmental.
The idea for an intergovernmental mechanism got support by member governments of
WMO and UNEP on account of several reasons. First, the US clout in the
decisionmaking of these bodies cannot be overlooked. Second, due to linkages between
climate change and the energy and land-use sectors the stakes were considerably higher
than ozone for governments worldwide to take active interest in assessments of the
problem. Third, the international environmental arena was already politicized because
climate change came in the wake of ozone. Peter Usher, Tolba's key advisor during the
ozone negotiations admits that the ad-hoc, low key, science driven (if politically
undemocratic) nature of the early ozone assessments which led to the Vienna Convention
could not be duplicated in climate change. This is because while "politics caught up with
ozone, climate change was born in politics" (Usher, 1997).
A final question in this counterfactual analysis is whether an intergovernmental
mechanism on climate change could have been set up sooner than it was. As noted
earlier, expert panels were set up on climate change under WMO and UN General
assembly mandates in 1974 and 1975 respectively, but the scientific information was too
sketchy to justify any policy interest. Even as late as the 1979 First World Climate
Conference, there was only enough evidence to provoke interest in climate change, not
enough to provoke serious international concern. In fact, the earliest opportunity when
steps could have been taken to set up an intergovernmental assessment mechanism was
right after the Villach 1985 workshop when an international consensus on the seriousness
of the issue was reached for the first time. In other words, under perfect hindsight, the
AGGG was probably avoidable. However, the fact that a more appropriate international
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assessment body was commissioned shortly thereafter reflects the uncharacteristic speed
with which the concerned international organizations iteratively improved upon their
earlier response.
From Conception to Birth: June 1987-November 1988
The precise form of the "intergovernmental mechanism" began to take shape in the
months immediately following the WMO Executive Council resolution in early June
1987. This was primarily a back-room effort of design, negotiation and compromise. The
hub of activity was in the US where a number of proposals were refined and discussed by
the various agencies. Much of this process is still shrouded in mystery and by most
accounts a large number of individuals at various US agencies including the State
Department, DoE and EPA played key roles. One proposal which bears some
resemblance to the eventual form of the IPCC can be traced back to Alan Hecht, Bo Doos
and others at National Climate Program Office. Doos, a Swedish meteorologist and
former director of the World Climate Program drew on his experience with the
Intergovernmental Panel on the First GARP Global Experiment (IPFGGE) in the mid-
1970s and proposed an "Intergovernmental Panel on the Assessment of Climate Change"
on similar lines (Doos, 1997). The proposal which eventually emerged after inputs from a
number of US agencies emphasized that this panel should include "representatives of
countries making major contributions to various aspects of ..climate change", and "allow
for adequate representation of countries from all regions..(while) ..representatives
of..international organizations should participate as observers" (Anonymous, 1987).
This proposal was never sent out formally by the US government to WMO, in part
because of the resistance of the then US Permanent Representative at the WMO to this
idea. However, WMO had been closely involved in the US effort. In the absence of an
official US initiative WMO took the lead and held discussions with UNEP on this
proposal. Eventually, a slightly modified version was sent out by the Secretary General of
WMO on March 25, 1988 to member governments inquiring whether their country would
like to be represented on a proposed "Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change"
(Obasi, 1988).
One major design choice that was also made during this period which had considerable
ramifications both on the subsequent size and structure of the IPCC was regarding the
scope of the proposed assessments. Should the assessments focus on the science of
climate change, its impacts, or the range of available response options, or all three?
Rational actor models suggest that "better" decisions might result from a more
comprehensive approach. Further, only comprehensive assessments can highlight key
uncertainties and data gaps which span across disciplines. On the other hand,
comprehensive assessments consume much more time, money and resources. Some argue
that there is also the risk that authoritative judgments from more quantitative disciplines
(usually in the natural sciences) might get "contaminated" by guarded conclusions from
disciplines which face considerably higher uncertainties. In the case of climate change,
conclusions regarding the magnitude and attribution climate change tend to be more
authoritative than statements about physical impacts, while statements about the
economic costs of damages and policy responses have vastly higher uncertainties. Thus,
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"narrow" assessments focusing primarily on the natural science components of the
problem could carry more certainty and hence, authority with policymakers. Therefore,
some analysts have been puzzled as to why the IPCC chose to do comprehensive
assessments of the science, impacts and responses in a manner which bore more
resemblance to the Climate Impact Assessment Program (ClAP) effort of the early 1970s
than to the more truncated assessments of the late 1970s and 1980s.
There is an intellectual and a human explanation for this puzzle. Intellectually, this
proposed mechanism was going to be the first "official", systematic assessment of
climate change at the international level, much like ClAP was at the national level in the
US. Therefore, it made some sense to investigate all aspects of the issue for precisely the
same reasons as it did for ClAP in the early 1970s. On the human front, one of the key
actors in the decisionmaking process which led to the formation of the IPCC was N.
Sundararaman, a US Federal Aviation Administration scientist on deputation at WMO.
He had started his career as a member of the ClAP assessment team between 1971-75
and believed that an approach on similar lines was the best way to structure the proposed
intergovernmental assessment. Sundararaman reportedly emphasized the need for a
comprehensive approach to his former colleagues in US agencies. He also helped draft
the 1987 WMO Executive Council resolution which provides the first hints for such an
approach: "(the) ad-hoc intergovernmental mechanism... (should) carry out
internationally coordinated scientific assessments of the magnitude, timing and potential
impact of climate change ". Though this resolution does not include response options,
they were subsequently brought on board when UNEP and WMO established tentative
terms of reference for the IPCC in summer 1988. An added impetus to the inclusion of
response options was provided by a draft resolution introduced by Malta at the UN
General Assembly, just weeks before the first plenary session of the !PCe. It called on
the IPCC to "immediately initiate action leading...to a comprehensive review and
recommendations with respect to...the science of climate change.. , social and economic
impact(s) .. , possible policy responses by Governments to delay, limit or mitigate the
impact of adverse climate change, relevant treaties and other legal instruments dealing
with climate, (and) elements for possible inclusion in a future international convention on
climate" (UNGA, 1988).
The science, impacts, responses scope also lent itself nicely to having three Working
Groups to look at each of these focus areas. Malta's proposal and calls for the IPCC to
include legal instruments as well as elements for a possible convention (in addition to
science, impacts and responses) did, however, provoke some discussion whether IPCC
should have five Working Groups instead of three. This dilemma is reflected in the
background papers prepared for the first IPCC plenary in November 1988 by N.
Sundararaman who had been appointed Secretary of the IPCC a few months earlier in
May (Sundararaman, 1988). Eventually, it was Mostafa Tolba who in his opening address
entitled "Warming: Warning" to the participants at the first IPCC plenary in his
characteristic authoritative style told the delegates "I suggest you consider establishing
three sUb-groups...to carry out simultaneous work in the three sectors of your activity:
scientific assessment, socioeconomic impacts and policy responses" (Tolba, 1988). This
shaped subsequent deliberations and a majority of the participating national delegations
supported Tolba's proposal of three Working Groups working in parallel: Working
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Group 1 looking at Science, Working Group II at Impacts and Working Group III at
Response Strategies. Malta's demand that IPCC also discuss legal instruments and
elements of a possible convention were subsequently folded into the mandate of Working
Group III (IPCC, 1989).
Bert Bolin of Sweden was elected to chair the first session of the IPCC, a formality prior
to his formal election as chairman of the IPCC. The choice of countries to chair the three
Working Groups reflected both technical and power endowments at that time, and had
been pre-negotiated. The United Kingdom was elected to chair Working Group 1 under
the leadership of meteorologist and WMO veteran John Houghton, the Soviets were
given charge of Working Group II under anotherWMO veteran Yuri Izrael, while the US
got the chairmanship of Working Group III and appointed Fred Bernthal, a State
Department official to chair it. Under Tolba's directive, the IPCC also established a small
bureau to coordinate the work of the Panel.
Evolution of the Ipcc: 1988-1997
As the preceding discussion shows, by the time the IPCC was functional in November
1988 the following key features in its assessment structure were already in place: it had
an intergovernmental status, joint WMO-UNEP sponsorship, a mandate to do
comprehensive assessments of the science, impacts and responses of climate change,
three Working Groups working in parallel to examine each of these components, and a
small Bureau to oversee the work of the Panel. The rationale for, and evolution of each of
these components have already been discussed. These design features have largely
survived till the present day, except for a change in the mandates of Working Groups II
and III and 1992.
It is also important to recognize what was missing in the IPCC structure and design in
1988 but evolved subsequently as the institution responded to fast racheting demands for
enhanced representation, transparency, credibility and decisionmaking relevance. During
the pre-establishment phase from 1986-88 the IPCC structure was shaped essentially by a
small group of individuals at WMO, UNEP and the US agencies. Once the IPCC was out
of the womb and buffeted by political pressures a somewhat different cast of characters
was responsible for its subsequent evolution. First, the authorizing agencies: WMO and
UNEP played increasingly marginal roles in the IPCC design. The US though still
continued to wield considerable influence through its scientists and bureaucrats who were
members of the Panel. Second, a new cast of influential individuals emerged led by the
Chairman of the IPCC, Bert Bolin. Third, IPCC was shaped considerably by exogenous
pressures which included demands of the FCCC bodies and the increased scrutiny of the
IPCC process and outputs by special interest groups, in particular, by many oil exporting
countries and the US fossil-fuel lobby.
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Overview of the IPCC Assessment Process
The work of the IPCC is conducted at three distinct levels (Moss, 1994). First, the IPCC hosts a plenary
session at the beginning of an assessment cycle. This also marks the end of the previous assessment. During
this plenary session government representatives review and approve the completed reports from the
previous cycle. They also set the agenda for the Panel's next round of activity. Environment and industry
groups have observer status during these sessions. After the plenary each Working Group prepares detailed
workplans and report outlines to implement its agenda. Nominations are then invited from experts from
governments, international and non governmental organizations and writing teams are finalized by the
chairs of individual Working Groups assisted by their respective Technical Support Units (TSU). In the
third and final tier of the process, each of the writing teams work in coordination with their respective
Working Group Chair, Bureau and Technical Support Units to draft their relevant section of the IPCC
report. This process is iterative and typically takes between one and a half to two years. It includes
comprehensive expert and government reviews and several "lead-author" meetings to review comments
and resolve inconsistencies across different sections of the report. The final outputs from each Working
Group are then presented for government approval their respective plenary session. The entire IPCC
assessment is then approved at a full IPCC plenary session.
This section explores the evolution of three critical design features: the peer review
process, the participation of developing country scientists and IPCC's attempts to abstain
from policymaking and yet be policy relevant.
Peer Review
While many have acknowledged the existence of a peer review mechanism for IPCC
reports, the extent and degree of sophistication of the process have largely been left
unexplored. To most, peer review is a binary variable: either it exists, or it does not. Most
recognized journals have peer reviews, as do many research reports. Thus, at first sight,
while having a peer review mechanism within the IPCC design is important, it is by no
means unique. However, the IPCC peer review is more comprehensive, by many orders
of magnitude, than that in an average journal. For example, draft chapters of the 1995
Working Group II Second Assessment report went through two full scale reviews: the
first involving anywhere from twenty to sixty expert reviewers per chapter (a total of 700
experts from 58 countries were involved) , and the second involving all IPCC member
governments and the experts who had sent their reviews in the first round. The action
taken by writing teams on review comments was monitored by the Working Group
Bureau and the Technical Support Unit.
It is important to note that there are two different outputs from the IPCC process:
policymaker summaries which are extensively reviewed and then approved line by line
by governments, and the underlying reports which have extensive expert and government
review, but are not subject to line by line approval. The latter has been much less political
than the policymaker summaries as it does not require line by line approval by
government representatives.
The organization of peer review process had not been discussed either in the negotiations
prior to the establishment of the IPCC, or during its first plenary session in 1988. The
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first discussion on this subject was held during the first session of the IPCC Bureau in
February 1989. During this meeting Working Group 1 (WG 1) indicated that a review of
its draft chapters by both contributing and external experts was included in its work plans
while the Working Group II (WG II) only indicated a review by its contributing authors
(IPCC, 1989). Somewhat more detailed discussions on the subject were held during the
second meeting of the IPCC Bureau in February 1990 when the draft chapters for the
First Assessment were nearing completion. The IPCC Bureau decided that "the draft
reports of WG I and WG II will undergo peer reviews. These two Working Groups are
free to choose the form of the peer review as long as the latter is conducted in such a
manner as to assure quality products" (IPCC, 1990b). Thus, during the preparation of the
First Assessment, the IPCC had no formal rules on who should participate in peer
reviews, or formal follow up mechanisms to ensure proper action is taken. Peer review
was more ad-hoc, based more on a tradition of scientific conduct and trust than on any
political norms. There were also severe budgetary constraints and there was no money to
impose more formal mechanisms.
The three Working Groups, however, catered to very different communities with vastly
differing levels of disciplinary cohesion, clearly defined "experts", or a shared set of peer
review standards. The natural science community in WG 1 was relatively mature and
well organized, experts on the subject were generally easily identifiable and a review
process on the lines of a scientific journal was conducted (though with substantially more
reviewers). The impacts community in WG II was, however, not so well developed.
There were also some concerns voiced by western scientists regarding the management of
the Working Group by the Soviets. This led the IPCC Bureau to impose some external
pressure to ensure that a wider community of impacts experts participated in the review
of WG II chapters. Working Group III (WG III) meanwhile was dominated by legal
experts and negotiators. The Bureau felt that the standards of a scientific journal-type
review could not realistically apply to this group and consequently did not impose any
review requirements. The "policymaker" summaries of all three Working Groups,
however, went through government review and approval before the First Assessment
Report was released.
Between 1990 and 1992 a number of political factors forced the IPCC to ensure that its
peer review process was formalized to carry more credibility with government
negotiators. First, the release of its First Assessment prepared by, what was billed as "the
best scientists in the world" put the institution under intense media scrutiny. Second, as
climate change neared the negotiation phase in the build up to the Rio Summit the
political environment became increasingly polarized. Powerful interest groups with huge
stakes in the issue now began to show much more interest in the IPCC assessment
process. Two notable entrants were lobbying arms of the US fossil-fuel industry: the
Global Climate Coalition (GCC) and the Climate Council. They brought with them the
"if you don't like the message, discredit the messenger" approach which had been
perfected to an art form in Washington lobbying circles. Also, climate change was
ratcheted one level above WMO and UNEP to the UN General Assembly when the latter
established the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC). IPCC meanwhile was
charged with preparing an interim report due for release in 1992 to aid the INC
deliberations for a possible climate convention.
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Since it was imperative that this interim report be politically credible to national
negotiators at the time of the Rio Summit, the IPCC Bureau in its fourth session in
August 1991 mandated that "the Working Groups should ensure as wide a peer review as
possible in order that the Supplement (Report) may find acceptance by governments"
(lPCC, 1991). The real hardening of IPCC rules of procedure (including peer review),
however took place during its eighth plenary session in Harare in November 1992 after
the Rio Summit and release of the 1992 Report. This is when The Task Force on IPCC
Structure presented its report to the plenary session. Among other things this report
emphasized that: the same review procedures should apply across all Working Groups,
the process of selecting contributors and reviewers should be made more open, since
developing country expert names might not show up in the "open" literature special
efforts must be made to get their names from their governments, the IPCC should
establish the best possible relations with relevant global research and observation
programs (to get access to the best experts), a master list of experts from all countries
should be available to all those involved in the IPCC, clear guidelines should be set
regarding the time for reviews, and peer review requirements for policymaker summaries
be carefully specified (IPCC, 1992).
Based on these recommendations, a formal set of rules governing peer review were
adopted during the ninth plenary session of the IPCC in June 1993. Specifically, a two
tier system of external reviews was formalized: the first by experts, and the second by all
IPCC member governments and all experts and contributors from the first round. It was
mandated that the expert review should include the following categories: specialists with
significant publications in particular areas, experts named in IPCC "master lists" based
on information supplied by various governments and organizations, and specialist
reviewers nominated by international organizations including those in the UN system,
The World Bank, Third World Academy of Sciences, OECD and so on. Perhaps most
significantly in terms of its political implications, it was formally stated that all IPCC
reports will have policymaker summaries which will be subject to line by line approval at
a plenary session of the relevant Working Group (IPCC, 1993).
Despite the hardening of IPCC rules over the years, the peer review of the underlying
assessment is not without its loopholes. First, the same review can often be submitted via
multiple pathways, a fact that was exploited considerably by many US industry lobbying
groups during the Second Assessment of the IPCC. They submitted identical reviews on
behalf of individual experts, certain non governmental organizations and as part of the
official US government review. This can lead to an unnecessary amplification of
essentially minority opinions. This problem is probably easy to fix if the IPCC rules
clearly stipulate that one review can only be submitted through a single channel. A
second problem is, what one IPCC author calls the problem of the "silent majority"
(Nakicenovic, 1997). Even if a majority of reviewers support certain conclusions they are
unlikely to mention that as part of their review comments while the few reviewers who
want the conclusions changed explicitly voice their dissatisfaction in their reviews. This
may result in changes in the document in response to just a few critical comments. There
are no easy remedies to solving this problem other than encouraging reviewers to include
conclusions they support, not just the ones they disagree with, a point which the IPCC
review guidelines already emphasize.
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Finally, a third, and potentially the most significant flaw is that even though extensive
peer review is conducted, the action on specific comments is largely left to the discretion
of the writing teams. Technical Support Units do playa watch-dog role but they can only
persuade authors to follow up on review comments which writing teams may have
inadequately dealt with. If these writing teams are dominated by opinionated experts
holding one particular viewpoint then conceivably, they could get away with ignoring
some, or a majority of all critical review comments. This may have been the case in
Chapter 6 of the Working Group III Second Assessment Report which used extremely
controversial assumptions to calculate the "social costs" of potential climate change
(Pearce et a!., 1995). For example, a cash value of $1.5 million was assigned to a human
life in the GECD against a mere $150,000 in the developing countries (Meyer and
Cooper, 1995). As a result, the Working Group III report failed to get plenary approval in
July 1995, a dubious first for the IPCC. The situation could have been avoided had there
been greater external supervision regarding action by the authors on peer review
comments. There is currently an active discussion within the IPCC to set up "editorial
boards" on the lines of a scientific journal to fix this flaw in the peer review process
(Watson, 1997). Whether this innovation is actually adopted and if it actually improves
the review mechanism remains to be seen.
The line by line consensus approval of policymaker summaries, meanwhile, is an
intensely political process. It is straightforward to see why countries such as small island
states which feel threatened by sea level rise would push for much tougher language on
climate change risks and the need for urgent action. Equally evident is why oil producing
countries which might suffer economically from any shift away from fossil fuels would
try to steer the IPCC message towards emphasizing scientific uncertainties and
greenhouse gases other than carbon-dioxide. Then, of course, while developing countries
want to emphasize that a bulk of past greenhouse gas emissions have come from the
industrialized world, the developed world would rather have the IPCC emphasize that a
bulk of future emissions will come from developing countries. All these are obviously
different shades of "the truth", none more scientifically defensible than the other. This
makes the IPCC process particularly susceptible to political pressure in terms of which
aspects its summaries should emphasize more.
Functioning in this highly polarized environment, the IPCC plenary approval process of
policymaker summaries often resembles a fox-trot performed by a drunken couple: one
lurch forward, followed by a sideways stagger, then a stumble backwards. A British
diplomat who attended the fourth IPCC plenary in Sundsvall in 1990 when the First
Assessment Report was released notes: "having started in a very organized fashion with
songs about the future from children's choirs...the meeting came close to a breakdown. It
finished at four o'clock in the morning, one day late, with most of the delegates having
abandoned their chairs in the conference hall to gather on the front podium and shout at
each other" (Brenton, 1994). The final negotiated statements from such sessions are often
based on least common denominator conclusions written in carefully hedged language. It
is indeed true that many IPCC conclusions are generally more vague and have many
more caveats than the more direct, policy-proactive statements that emanated from
conferences such as Villach 1985, Villach and Bellagio 1987 and Toronto 1988.
However, the IPCC conclusions, in their modesty, are much more scientifically
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defensible than the distinctly activist stance taken by some of its predecessors, such as the
1987 call by Bellagio experts setting of "tolerable" rates of temperature and sea level rise.
It is important to recognize a frequent trade-off assessments are virtually driven to make
is between scientific credibility and policy specificity of conclusions. Line by line
approval of policymaker summaries by consensus in the IPCC is clearly an attempt to
buy global credibility amongst governments while the VillachlBellagio workshops were
more an attempt to effect prompt policy outcomes. Neither approach is implicitly
superior. However, the fact that key conclusions from both rounds of IPCC Assessments
did manage to catalyze the policymaking process indicates that with adequate skill,
expertise and persistence, policy impact need not come at the cost of credibility.
An important question is whether the political credibility of the IPCC can be preserved in
ways other than requiring line by line consensus approval of summaries. After all, with
the establishment of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) in 1990, the
IPCC is no longer the forum to debate policy. And governments do not need to
consensually approve science, particularly after their scientists have both participated in
writing and reviewing the assessment. Furthermore, with the FCCC now having its own
functional Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA) to interface
between the IPCC assessments and policymakers, it might be sensible to remove the line
by line governmental scrutiny of IPCC summaries. In practical terms, however, it might
not be politically feasible to take back what governments have already become used to.
Moreover, plenary sessions often serve as the only forum for many governments,
particularly developing countries, to openly hold the IPCC accountable for whether or not
it adequately considered the views sent in by their experts during peer review. This is
indeed a very important function which IPCC plenaries serve and should not be done
away with. Therefore, a compromise solution might be to retain plenary acceptance of
underlying documents. As far as policymaker summaries are concerned, even if line by
line approval is retained, approval rules can be changed so that acceptance is by a
significant majority instead of complete consensus. This would most likely retain political
credibility with a majority of governments and yet prevent one or two governments
(which is usually the case) from unnecessary holding the process hostage by stalling
plenary approval or substantially diluting the IPCC conclusions.
Developing Country Participation
In his letter to member governments announcing the proposal to establish the IPCC on
March 25 1988, WMO Secretary General Obasi noted that the membership of the Panel
should include major greenhouse gas emitting countries, ensure equitable geographic
representation and allow for participation by countries with considerable scientific
expertise on the subject. At the same time Obasi cautioned "it is obvious, however, that
the Panel should be small enough so that it can function effectively" (Obasi, 1988). This
turned out to be an inconsistent set of goals and the idea of a small core membership for
each IPCC Working Group which was adopted during the first IPCC plenary session
(IPCC, 1988) was subsequently abandoned (IPCC, 1989) in order to allow for widespread
participation particularly by developing countries. As Bert Bolin commented to a
climatologist colleague soon after he was asked to chair the IPCC "right now, many
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countries, especially developing countries, simply do not trust assessments in which their
scientists and policymakers have not participated. Don't you think global credibility
demands global representation? "(Schneider, 1991).
Operationalizing effective developing country participation, however, has been, and
continues to be, a major challenge for the IPCC. In fact developing country participation
is the only issue (other than the IPCC budget) to be discussed in almost every session of
the IPCC Bureau from 1989 to 1996. In its very first session in February 1989 the IPCC
Bureau established an "Ad-hoc Sub-group on Ways to Increase Participation of the
Developing Countries in IPCC Activities" chaired by A. AI-Gain of Saudi Arabia, who
was also the Vice-Chair of the IPCC. Other members of this group consisted of
representatives from Brazil, Senegal and Zimbabwe. Their findings were presented to the
second plenary session of the IPCC in June 1989. A number of action items were
proposed by this group both for the short term and the medium to long term.
Four short term (18-24 months) items were identified: expanding financial support for
developing country experts to attend sessions of the IPCC and its Working Groups;
identification of developing experts and their area of expertise and to eventually develop
"master resource lists" of these experts at the national level; formation of national
committees which can use IPCC findings to gamer resources to set up national action
programs; and to have IPCC sponsored conferences and seminars to help increase
awareness. For the longer term (2 - 10 years) the following four priorities were identified:
the IPCC work should provide a useful input to existing technical cooperation plans, for
example, to shape the research priorities of the African Center of Meteorological
Applications for Development; using existing WMO and UNEP programs such as the
Global Environmental Monitoring System and World Climate Programme to disseminate
relevant information, technology and expertise; to encourage developing countries to
include climate change considerations in their development plans; and to develop
intellectual and scientific resources in developing countries.
Based on these findings, participants at the Second IPCC plenary in 1989 decided to
establish a "Special Committee on the Participation of Developing Countries " under the
chairmanship of Jean Ripert of France (who later became the first chairman of the INC)
and with representatives from four other developed, and five developing countries. This
committee met three times between September 1989 and June 1990 and its findings were
presented to the fourth IPCC plenary session in Sundsvall (Sweden) in August 1990
when the First Assessment Report of the IPCC was also approved. The committee noted
five factors which limit the full participation by developing countries: insufficient
information about the problem, ineffective channels to disseminate this information,
limited number of trained scientists, institutional difficulties such as lack of coordination
between various ministries which might have a stake in the climate issue, and limited
financial resources. Its recommendations largely echoed those made by its predecessor,
the Ad-hoc group on developing country participation, discussed earlier.
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Table I-PARTICIPATION IN IPCC PLENARY SESSIONS
Year Non-DECD
Countries
Total Countries
In terms of concrete action, IPCC efforts to encourage developing country participation
over the years can be described as a partial success. By the time of the second plenary
session of the IPCC in 1989 most OECD countries (and the USSR) were already
represented on the Panel. Non-OECD participation took much longer to increase. As
shown in Table 1 it has grown steadily from a mere 14 at the first plenary in 1988 to 48 in
1990 when the First Assessment Report was released, to 98 in 1995 during the eleventh
plenary session of the IPCC when the Second Assessment was released. Recall, one of
the primary goals of having an "intergovernmental" mechanism in the first place was to
get governments involved in the climate change issue. In this respect the IPCC has
certainly been an unqualified success. A majority of developing countries from Bhutan to
Benin which might not have been interested in climate change nine years ago are now
willing to send their delegates to IPCC sessions.
Over the years the IPCC has undertaken several specific measures to encourage
participation by developing country scientists both as authors and reviewers. Almost half
of the annual budget outlays from its Trust Fund are used to pay for trips made by these
experts to attend the meetings of the Panel and its Working Groups. For example, as early
as 1989 (barely a year after the IPCC was set up) about US $ 254,000 were spent to pay
for 85 trips by 80 developing country experts to attend IPCC meetings (IPCC, 1990a).
This number has grown substantially in recent years. In fact, financial support for at least
one developing country expert to attend each writing team meeting of every IPCC
chapter was made mandatory during its Second Assessment cycle. Many developed
countries have also stipulated part of their contributions to the IPCC Trust Fund to
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support the research and/or travel of developing country experts. In addition, another
significant component of the IPCC budget is used to translate its documents in all UN
languages for broader outreach. Furthermore, when the rules of procedure of the IPCC
were amended in 1993 it was explicitly stipulated that for each chapter in the Second
Assessment there should be at least one developing country lead-author. Finally, the new
rules stipulated that the chairmanship of each Working Group was to be shared by one
developed and one developing country scientist.
Although these measures have improved the situation, they have clearly not been
sufficient. A major shortcoming of all IPCC efforts including its Second Assessment has
been that information on climate change impacts and the feasibility of adaptation and
mitigation options is still sorely lacking for developing countries. Global generalizations
are often drawn from a relatively over-sampled set of data from a few developed
countries. This situation cannot be corrected unless assessments have a more regional
focus, a fact which is currently under serious consideration by the IPCC for the design of
its Third Assessment (Watson, 1997).
Perhaps even more importantly, the assessment efforts of the IPCC need to work in
tandem with research and data gathering, particularly in developing countries to plug the
gaps in existing knowledge. However, with the notable exception of the IPCC-OECD
Methodologies for Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventories which are being widely
applied to construct national greenhouse gas inventories, there has been very little
application of other IPCC methodologies to conduct standardized impact and mitigation
assessments in developing countries, or to use the research gaps identified in IPCC
reports to shape future research. One reason is that with a total professional staff of less
than eight (to manage the Secretariat and all three Working Groups) and a shoe-string
budget, the IPCC was never designed to duplicate research efforts of well established
programs such as WCRP and IGBP. Further, while the IPCC has several design features
(such as governmental participation and policymaker summaries) to build the bridge
forward towards policy, it does not have effective mechanisms to build the bridge back
towards research. Perhaps, at the end of the assessment process, there should be an
institutionalized mechanism within the IPCC to engage its authors in a discussion with
the managers of collaborative research programs, NGOs and multilateral development
agencies. These meetings could be used both to market any methodologies the IPCC
might have developed and to help such organizations plan future research so as to reduce
existing research/data gaps which the IPCC assessment may have identified. However,
IPCC Chairman Bert Bolin notes that the Panel has consciously stayed away from
directly shaping research priorities. This is to avoid unnecessary politicization which he
believes would undoubtedly result if IPCC experts had the power to influence where
future research dollars went (Bolin, 1997).
The long term solution to improved developing country involvement in climate change
assessments hinges critically on the building of indigenous capacity and awareness in
these countries. The IPCC has only made some limited advances in this direction.
According to Roberto Acosta-Moreno of Cuba, one of only a handful of developing
country Convening Lead Authors in the IPCC Second Assessment, the Panel has helped
raise awareness about the problem in Cuba. It has also helped train more than 50 Cuban
19
scientists through their participation in IPCC writing teams and workshops. However, he
notes that the extent of benefits a developing country can draw from participation in the
IPCC is a strong function of the prevailing levels of education and intellectual expertise.
Cuba, in this respect, might have been an exception because it has reasonably trained
experts which the IPCC could draw on and further encourage (Acosta-Moreno, 1997).
This might not be true for a majority of other developing countries and therefore merely
encouraging participation might not contribute significantly to capacity building in these
countries.
Low preexisting levels of developing country research capacity which might inhibit their
effective participation should realistically be recognized as an externally imposed
constraint on the effectiveness of the IPCC. The IPCC does not have the mandate, funds
or the expertise to conduct the job of national governments or multilateral development
agencies in terms of capacity building. Neither can it micromanage dissemination and
outreach of its assessments within these countries lest it be misconstrued as "propaganda"
by the host government. Similarly, it is well known that most IPCC communications are
dealt with by one specialized agency (such as the Department of Meteorology) within
many developing countries. These agencies often do a poor job at transmitting IPCC
communications and reports to other agencies (such as the Ministries of Environment,
Energy, Transportation and so on) which might also have a stake in the climate problem.
This constrains the effectiveness of several aspects of the IPCC process including author
and reviewer nominations as well as dissemination of results. Yet, there is little the IPCC
can do to improve these internal communication networks as it might be tantamount to
interference in the domestic affairs of the concerned country.
In conclusion, while the IPCC has made concerted efforts to engage developing country
scientists, these efforts have only met with limited success. There are also considerable
gaps in data and research with regard to climate change impacts and mitigation
information in developing countries. This, at least partially, stems from the lack of any
formal coordination between IPCC assessments and the research priorities of multilateral
programs in this field. The long term solution to more effective developing country
participation is enhanced awareness and the building of indigenous research capacity.
The IPCC however might not be the right forum to effectively address these endemic
issues. They should, instead, be addressed by developing countries themselves in
conjunction with multilateral development aid agencies.
Links to Decisionmaking
There are two intertwined aspects of the IPCC: assessment outputs and the assessment
process itself. Similarly, policymaking has two aspects: the final outcomes in terms of
conventions signed and decisions taken, and the process of arriving at these decisions.
Policy influence of the IPCC therefore has four components: how the IPCC outputs have
shaped policy outcomes, how the IPCC process has shaped policy outcomes, how IPCC
outputs have shaped the policy process, and how the IPCC process has shaped the policy
process. In the context of climate change few policy outcomes have been observed. Yet,
it is premature to conclude that the IPCC has been ineffective. Instead, the policy
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influence of the IPCC should be judged by how its outputs and process have shaped the
policymaking process over time.
Links Between IPCC Assessment Outputs and the Policy Process
In its first session in February 1989 the IPCC Bureau adopted a proposal by Working
Group I to incorporate a 20 page "policy document" in its assessment which would
summarize the scientific results and place them into perspective. The Bureau then
requested the other two Working Groups to produce similar "policy documents" (lPCC,
1989). These became the well known policymaker summaries of IPCC Assessments. The
summary produced by Working Group I for its First Assessment is widely regarded as
being very authoritative. One of its statements that (under a business as usual scenario)
the world is likely to see "a rate of increase of global mean temperature during the next
century...that is greater than that seen over the past 10,000 years" was, by most accounts,
very influential in catalyzing the decisionmaking process which eventually led to the
signing of the FCCC in 1992. The summaries for the other two Working Groups were
much less successful due to a lack of consensus, significantly higher uncertainties, and
the implicit value laden nature of many conclusions on climate change impacts and
responses. This trend has largely continued on to the Second Assessment. Once again, it
was a line in the Working Group 1 Summary: "the balance of evidence suggests a
discernible human influence on climate change" which, in many ways, defined the entire
Second Assessment and provided a rallying cry for environmentalists and governments
(including the chief US negotiator Under Secretary Tim Wirth) that it was time to "put
the science behind us" and commit to a legally binding climate treaty (Wirth, 1997).
That an assessment whose policymaker summaries require word by word consensual
approval by government representatives with very obvious political stakes could still
come up with a few key conclusions that provide significant triggers for subsequent
policy action should not be dismissed lightly. On the other hand, the policy usefulness of
IPCC impact and response assessments has been constrained by significantly higher
uncertainties. They have also not done an adequate job of effectively communicating the
nature of prevailing uncertainties (whether uncertainty stems from a lack of consensus or
a lack of data, what the extent of disagreement is, where precisely uncertainties are in the
causal chain, and so on) in these areas. Thus overall, the influence of IPCC outputs on the
policy process has been occasional, but significant. The nature of the influence, on the
other hand, has been largely symbolic in terms of triggering and sustaining policy
concern and considerably less in shaping subsequent action.
Links Between the IPCC Assessment Process and the Policy Process
The interactions between the IPCC process and the climate change policymaking have
had an interesting evolution and, in fact, go back to the time when the IPCC was
established in November 1988. Two months later, in January 1989, the UN General
Assembly adopted a resolution proposed by Malta on "Protection of global climate for
present and future generations of mankind". In addition to requiring the IPCC to conduct
assessments of science, impacts and responses, this resolution formally charged the heads
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of WMO and UNEP working through the IPCC to provide a comprehensive review and
recommendations on "the identification and possible strengthening of relevant existing
international legal instruments having a bearing on climate; (and) elements for inclusion
in a possible future international convention on climate" (UNGA, 1989). Thus, in its
initial years the IPCC fulfilled the unique dual role of assessing knowledge to advise
policy, and at the same time directly helping shape policy itself.
In response to the General Assembly resolution the heads of WMO and UNEP
established a small "WMO/UNEP Task Force on a Convention on Climate Change"
which met for the first time in October 1989. This advisory body consisted of two
representatives each from WMO and UNEP, the coordinator of the Second World
Climate Conference (to be held in 1990) and three experts from the IPCC Legal Measures
Sub-group of Working Group III. The goal was to draw on the ongoing work in IPCC
Working Group III which was debating possible elements for inclusion in a climate
convention and use them to arrive at specific "action oriented measures" which national
governments could agree to as part of a possible climate convention. A less obvious, if
politically more important, goal of this task force was to keep the deliberations for the
climate convention low key and to prevent them from becoming enmeshed in the much
more political UN General Assembly. This was Tolba's attempt, assisted by WMO and
IPCC, to duplicate the informal "ad-hoc group on legal and technical experts" which had
led to the signing of the Vienna Convention on Ozone. The IPCC had direct input into
this task force, but the latter was soon replaced by the more formal, Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee (INC) under the auspices of the UN General Assembly sponsored
in 1990.
The IPCC process contributed to the setting of the INC in two ways. First, the high
profile nature of the then ongoing IPCC First Assessment convinced many governments
of the need to seriously negotiate a climate convention. Second, until then the IPCC had
achieved limited success in its efforts to engage developing countries for its First
Assessment cycle. This made some large developing countries, in particular Brazil and
Mexico very suspicious of the IPCC (though it is important to note that many other
developeing countries, particularly from Africa were very supportive of the IPCC), and
consequently of the small Task Force on a Climate Convention. Furthermore, they
believed that climate change was closely linked to development, and hence not purely a
technical issue (Bodansky, 1994). They therefore pressured a political body, the UN
General Assembly, to take charge, a move which was eventually supported by the US,
their close ally. These opinions came to the fore during the meeting of an open-ended ad-
hoc group of government representatives convened by WMO and UNEP in September
1990. This led to the creation of the INC under the auspices of the UN General
Assembly. Climate science and policy were thus formally split and housed in two
separate intergovernmental mechanisms with different sponsorships.
The INC held its first session in February 1991 and met four more times until the signing
of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) in June 1992. According the
Jean Ripert who chaired the INC since its inception until 1993, the IPCC process played
important substantive and symbolic roles during the protracted negotiations for the
climate convention. Ripert, a senior French diplomat had been closely involved in the
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IPCC process prior to his election as INC chair. He had chaired the IPCC Committee on
Participation of Developing Countries and had also attended the meetings of IPCC
Working Group III where elements of a possible convention were being deliberated.
Ripert believes that by providing a "first-cut" at elements of a possible convention,
Working Group III of the IPCC made an important substantive contribution to the
subsequent negotiations as it made the work of the INC more efficient than it would have
been had they started from scratch (Borione and Ripert, 1994; Ripert, 1997). On the more
symbolic side, the fact that the IPCC Chair Bert Bolin addressed each session of the INC
and kept negotiators abreast with ongoing IPCC assessment activities helped keep "the
pot hot". More significantly, the scientific consensus reached by a credible, international
group of experts in IPCC Working Group I during its First Assessment as well as its
reaffirmation of earlier findings in the 1992 Report just prior to the Rio Summit played a
critical role in pushing the negotiations towards a convention. Ripert concludes that the
negotiation and signing of the climate convention would "definitely not" have been
possible without the IPCC (Ripert, 1997).
Shortly after the FCCC was signed in 1992 the INC elected a new chairman, Ambassador
Raul Estrada Oyela of Argentina. Meanwhile IPCC underwent a major restructure,
guided in part by the twin goals of ensuring greater developing country representation
and making its assessments more responsive to the changing needs of the policy makers.
The challenge now was to operationalize the various goals of the FCCC. For example,
Article 4.1 of the Convention called on all parties to the Convention "to develop,
periodically update, publish and make available inventories of anthropogenic emissions...
using compatible methodologies agreed upon by the Conference of Parties". IPCC
offered to build on an effort it already had underway in collaboration with the OECD to
develop these methodologies, a proposal which was readily accepted by the INC. These
methodologies are being widely tested and applied in many countries and form the
internationally accepted basis for the reporting of greenhouse gas emissions by developed
countries under the FCCC. This is a seminal example of a dynamic assessment process
directly feeding into a dynamic decisionmaking process. The INC also expressed interest
in receiving IPCC input in three other areas: "assessment of the relative forcing of
different greenhouse gases, ..the state of knowledge for assessing impacts of climate
change, ..and an evaluation of current scenarios of greenhouse gas emissions" (Estrada-
Oyela, 1993). More importantly this information was desired before the First Meeting of
the Conference of the Parties (CoP) in March 1995. The IPCC was able to respond to all
three requests by producing a three-part 1994 Special Report, in time for the March 1995
meeting although its Second Assessment was released a year later.
Overall, however, the interaction between the IPCC and the FCCC process has had a
rocky history. Over the years there have been concerns voiced within the INC as to
whether IPCC would be able to deliver what the negotiators need and when they need it
(Box 2). This problem has been an endemic feature of many institutionalized assessment
processes. Lawmakers in the US, for example, had similar complaints about both the
National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP) and the Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA). In the case of the IPCC, however, the trade-off between the time
required for "proper" assessment practice and decisionmaking relevance was even more
exacerbated. This is because of many aspects in its design including intergovernmental
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status, multiple rounds of peer review and a mandate to have adequate representation of
developing country experts.
In recent years, the IPCC has initiated two institutional sets of responses to make its
outputs more in tune with the needs of its primary users and to deliver them in a time
frame which suits their decisionmaking cycles. In March 1993, a few months after the
signing of the Climate Convention, IPCC Chairman Bert Bolin wrote to his counterpart at
the INC to start an ongoing dialog between the two institutions. This resulted in the
creation of the IPCC-INC Joint Working Party (lWP) consisting of senior officials from
both organizations. The lWP met for the first time in November 1993 and has continued
to meet regularly since then. The only cosmetic modification was that the INC was
replaced by the Secretariat of the FCCC after the first meeting of the Conference of
Parties (CoP) in March 1995. The (old) JWP now goes under the name of the Joint
Working Group (JWG) of the officers of the IPCC and the Bodies to the Framework
Convention. Issues discussed in these meetings over the years include the development
and testing of IPCC-OECD methodologies for greenhouse gas emissions inventories, the
contributions of different gases to climate change, decisions regarding allocation of
emissions from bunker fuels, IPCC inputs to the INC review of adequacy of
commitments made by certain parties to the FCCC, specific informational inputs the
IPCC could provide at the various sessions of the INC/CoP, and so on.
BOX 2
The Frankenstein Syndrome
In his remarks to the Royal Geographic Society in London on May 31, 1994, INC Chairman Raul Estrada-
Oyela said that for the time being the Convention process was "waiting for (scientific) inputs from the
IPCC but I wonder if they will come in time. Almost one year ago, explaining the needs of the Convention
to the IPCC Bureau, I had the feeling that the IPCC was suffering (some) kind of 'Dr. Frankenstein
Syndrome'. After all, the idea of a Convention was nourished by the IPCC, but now the Convention starts
to walk and begins to demand additional food, the IPCC answered that it had its own program of work and
could not deliver products by client's request. ... We hoped, for instance that the Convention would profit
from an IPCC workshop on the objectives of the Climate Convention in Fortaleza, Brazil, in April (1994).
However, the workshop was postponed for October (1994), most probably for very scientifically sound
motives. The point is that the INC shall meet next August and we are not going to have that input then"
(Estrada-Oyela, 1994). London based New Scientist took these comments to make a news story entitled
"Frankenstein Syndrome Hits Climate Treaty" marking the first public criticism of the IPCC by an INC
official (The New Scientist, 1994).
The second institutional response instituted by the IPCC to make its outputs more timely
and digestible without compromising their scientific credibility is its diversification of
assessment outputs to include Special Reports and Technical Papers. Special Reports
constitute a more targeted (as opposed to a comprehensive) assessment of specific issues
of decisionmaking relevance on which information is needed on a one-two year time
frame. The IPCC has published two Special Reports, one in 1992 before the signing of
the FCCC and the second in 1994, before the first meeting of the CoP, both in response to
specific demands from international negotiators. Technical Papers are an even more
recent innovation and may owe their creation to the "Frankenstein Controversy"(Box 2).
The IPCC realized that its continued relevance depended critically on its ability to
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provide concise, "rapid response" reports on key issues relevant to the Convention. The
four Technical Papers which the IPCC released in 1997 do just that. They were prepared
on a schedule of about six months and essentially distilled information from the IPCC
Second Assessment relevant to a few key issues that the FCCC bodies (the secretariat,
SBSTA and Subsidiary Body for Implementation) were grappling with. Since these
papers were essentially drawing on the Second Assessment which had already been
approved by governments, the problem of line by line approval by government
representatives was also skillfully avoided.
More important than the details of these institutional innovations is the fact that there is
an ongoing dialog between the producers and users of assessments. This interaction
between the assessment and decisionmaking processes has not been perfect, and indeed
cannot be. Scientists cannot always deliver information in the form and time frame that
political negotiators might find useful. Nevertheless, this ongoing interaction has not only
provided useful inputs to the negotiation process but has also helped shape IPCC outputs
in response to user needs. As shown by the examples of the Joint Working Group, the
IPCC Special Reports and Technical papers, despite its cumbersome size, political and
institutional constraints, the assessment process has indeed shown a capacity for iterative
improvements and institutional learning. Thus, the richest interaction between the IPCC
and climate change decisionmakers has been at the process level.
Conclusions
Assessments are often viewed as black boxes whose only measurable metric is the reports
they produce. This paper underscores the importance of viewing them as dynamic social
processes. The following paragraphs evaluate the institution along three critical
dimensions: scientific credibility, institutional innovation and policy relevance.
Scientific Credibility
An important point which is often overlooked is that the IPCC was the product of an
intensely political process within the US, and the UN system. The specific purpose for
setting it up was also political: to engage governments worldwide in climate change
decisionmaking. Thus, it is somewhat of a paradox that the IPCC managed to attract and
sustain the participation of high caliber scientists and has consistently produced reports
that carry credibility in scientific circles. Part of the answer lies in the multiplicity of
political actors (various US agencies, UNEP, WMO, and many different countries) and
the divergence in their respective interests. This may have led to a scenario in which all
actors had to give up control of the assessment process by nominating a credible
independent scientist to chair the IPCC, as well as through procedural rules such as
universal participation, process transparency, and so on. Bert Bolin's nomination as IPCC
chair in 1988 lent credibility to the nascent assessment process and probably induced
other eminent scientists to participate. This set forth a self-reinforcing mechanism: the
more credible experts there were already in the IPCC, the more attractive it was for other
established experts to join, the more internal strength the institution had to defend its
scientific integrity against political pressures. It is not entirely inconceivable that had a
single or more unified group of political actors been responsible for the creation of the
25
IPCC, or, if a bureaucrat or even a scientist of lesser stature been nominated as chair, the
assessment process might have been a non-starter or spiraled towards lower and lower
credibility.
Institutional Innovation and Learning
Although the external contours of the IPCC have by and large been preserved over the
two assessment cycles, it has exhibited a certain amount of dynamism in response to
changing circumstances. Some examples of institutional innovation discussed in this
paper include: the decision to produce policymaker summaries (1989), establishment of a
Special Committee for Participation of Developing Countries (1989-90), preparing a
special report to aid Earth Summit negotiations (1992), restructuring of IPCC Working
Groups to learn from the First Assessment experience (1992-93), starting a process of
interactive dialog with officials from the FCCC bodies (1993-), the ongoing IPCC-OECD
effort to standardize reporting on greenhouse gas inventories (1991-), and the
introduction of "rapid response" Technical Papers for FCCC bodies (1996-). Few
international organizations, let alone large scale assessment bodies have shown such
institutional agility and learning.
These adaptations over the years have clearly enhanced the IPCC's survivability in an
environment where its predecessor, the AGGG failed to make a mark. A more interesting
question, however, is not whether but how the IPCC has been able to display such
institutional learning. First, there are in-built features within it such as plenary sessions
and regular interaction with FCCC bodies which provide a forum for stakeholders to
discuss and shape subsequent assessment activities. This dynamic interaction probably
makes the assessment process more responsive to changing user needs. Another
important feature of the IPCC is that participants do not get paid or hold "permanent"
positions. Compared to more hardened bureaucracies this reduces incentives for
maintaining "status-quo" within the IPCC. Finally, idiosyncratic factors such as
leadership, both in stature and substance cannot be overlooked.
It must, however, be pointed out the IPCC has exhibited this dynamism within a rather
limited domain. It studiously stays clear from policy recommendations. It even avoids
shaping the priorities of global change research programs to avoid unnecessary
politicization of its assessment process. Many argue that this sanitized approach and
IPCC's reluctance to "get its hands dirty" may have made it less useful than it could have
been. Others, most notably IPCC managers contend that this was the only way the body
could preserve its scientific credibility.
Relevance and Policy Impact
The appropriateness of an assessment activity is a function of where the issue is in the
policy cycle. The Villach workshops in the early 1980s were probably an appropriate
mechanism for assessing scientific knowledge on climate change at the time there were
held. They were probably not sufficient to get global governmental agreement on a
complex, multi-sectoral, uncertain and political problem as climate change. This paper
argues that something like the IPCC was an evolutionary necessity.
Comparisons are often drawn between the ozone and climate change experiences. The
ozone assessments through the 1980s did not have significant governmental involvement
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or nearly as many procedural rules. Nor did they have as large and diverse a participant
pool as the IPCC. One question therefore is, could ozone have been duplicated in
climate? This research argues that it would not have been possible. Climate change bears
a close relationship with the energy and land-use sectors which in tum are much more
central to economic development than CFC use. Consequently, by its very nature climate
change is much more political than ozone. Second, climate change may have suffered
from ozone recoil. For example, there was reluctance in some quarters to let Mostafa
Tolba dominate climate change the way he had, ozone. This may have influenced many
aspects of IPCC design. Furthermore, agreement on a protocol after a framework
convention was faster in ozone because the US and most other OECD countries were
strongly behind it while major industry groups, Japan and Russia were no longer opposed
to it. A climate protocol has not been negotiated thus far because some powerful
governments, particularly the US are still not completely supportive of it. This in tum is
because the extremely influential US domestic fossil fuel lobby is strongly opposed any
binding agreement. Thus the extent to which different global environmental issues may
or may not get resolved may depend more on where powerful political actors stand and
the economic power of the lobbies opposed to an agreement than on whether or not
assessments of those problems were inherently more or less superior.
Given that a climate protocol has still not been signed what are some benchmarks to
assess the performance of the IPCC during its first two assessment cycles? As noted
earlier, according to Jean Ripert, the founder chairman of the INC, the FCCC would
"certainly not" have been possible without the IPCC. It is equally important to note that
Ripert is not a scientist with a stake in the IPCC but a diplomat from France, a country
which has limited political interest in climate change. The biggest contribution of the
IPCC, however, has not been at the level of aiding spectacular decisions but rather at the
level of low-key process interactions with its users. It has provided inputs which may not
have caused decisions to be made but may have made decisionmaking more efficient than
it would have been without the IPCC.
An indirect measure of the relevance of the IPCC to policymaking comes from the fact
that many industry lobbying groups invest a lot of resources in reading the fine print of
IPCC reports, attend its plenary sessions and even conduct expensive media campaigns
which cast aspersions on IPCC findings and authors. They would clearly not have
invested so much time and money had the IPCC not been critical to decisionmaking. On
the other hand, environmental advocacy groups which were so active on the assessment
arena in the 1980s have stopped doing their own assessments. In November 1988 only
one environmental advocacy group attended the first plenary session of the IPCC. Many
others had elected instead to attend a conference in Hamburg to follow their own climate
agenda. Now, many draw legitimacy from the IPCC. They attend IPCC sessions in large
numbers, cite its conclusions and their contributions to IPCC activity in public statements
and even annual reports. The IPCC has not demanded hegemonic status, it may have
commanded it.
Finally, in the aftermath of big international conferences issue salience fades rapidly.
This happened after the Stockholm Conference in 1972. It has also happened after the
1992 Earth Summit for two of the three issues for which conventions were signed:
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desertification and biodiversity. Yet, climate change has remained highly salient both in
the media and on the policy agenda. There were no major assessments other than the
IPCC during this time, no major international environmental agreements (so no case for
Montreal Protocol type spillovers), and no dramatically "hot summers" to capture media
attention as they did in the late 1980s. In other words, most other causal factors were
pointing in the direction of decreased policy salience of climate change after 1992. The
fact that serious discussions are still on for a climate treaty is at least partly due to the
IPCC Second Assessment activity and its findings.
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up partly in response to President Kennedy's address to the United Nations General Assembly in 1961 in
which he called for the "peaceful uses of satellites" (Bolin, 1997). One of the first recognitions by a non-
governmental organization (NGO) of the climate change threat was at a 1963 meeting sponsored by the
Conservation Foundation which concluded that "it is estimated that a doubling of carbon dioxide content of
the atmosphere would produce a temperature rise of 3.8 degrees Celsius" (Kellogg, 1987). The first official
recognition came from the US President's Science Advisory Committee in 1965 when, amongst other
things, it recognized that climate change could be caused by human activities and could have important
consequences (PSAC, 1965).
iii The global cooling debate subsided after the WMO sponsored International Symposium on Long Term
Climate Fluctuations in 1975. This resulted from a conclusion reached at this symposium that low-lying
industrial aerosols and smoke particles do not cause a cooling of the lower atmosphere when they are over
land, which is where much of the pollution exists (Kellogg et aI., 1975).
" Coincident developments during this period included: two major assessments of climate change by the
National Research Council (NRC, 1983) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA, 1983) in the United
States, the widespread diffusion of the finding that the warming produced by carbon-dioxide would be
matched in magnitude by the combined warming effect of other greenhouse gases over the long term
(Ramanthan et aI., 1985), and the high degree of public and policy-maker interest in the threat of ozone-
layer depletion which eventually led to the signing of the Vienna Convention in 1985. Excessive detail is
avoided to prevent digression from the main theme of this paper but the reader is referred to the many
published historical accounts of this period, e.g. (Revelle, 1985; Kellogg, 1987; Brenton, 1994).
VThe years 1987 and 1988 were marked by severe heat waves in North America, Hurricane Gilbert struck
the Caribbean and caused more than $1 billion in damage, there was a freak hurricane in the English
Channel and a chunk of ice approximately 100 miles long and 25 miles wide broke off the coast of
Antarctica. These events contributed to heightened public concern both on the possibility of warming
trends and the possibility of increased risk to extreme climatic events.
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